

## CHAPTER 02 Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

### MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. Which category of interest is usually considered the most basic and a prerequisite for other goals?
- a. Security
  - b. Economic welfare
  - c. Ideological
  - d. Geographic land

ANS: A                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

2. In contrast to the anticipated stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, what was the condition of the Iraqi state during the 2003 Iraq War?
- a. A largely unified and healthy population and infrastructure
  - b. A fully loyal and patriotic public willing to fight the United States
  - c. A society on the edge of collapse from economic sanctions
  - d. A population prepared to facilitate democratic transition

ANS: C                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Remembering

3. Why did the United Nations Security Council *not* endorse the preventive war against Iraq in 2003?
- a. The members of the Security Council believed that Iran was a bigger threat than Iraq, and that the council should direct its energy there instead.
  - b. The Security Council is unable to endorse military action against sovereign countries.
  - c. The United Nations General Assembly would veto any action by the Security Council.
  - d. Several permanent members of the Security Council opposed going to war against Iraq and could veto any endorsement of the war.

ANS: D                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

4. A person goes to college with the hope of improving his or her earning power and future income upon graduation. This is an example of which type of goal that an actor might have?
- a. Security
  - b. Material welfare
  - c. Ideological
  - d. Power

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Applying

5. Leaders within a country may want to enact democratic reform in order to increase voter participation. This is an example of what kind of state goal?
- a. Security
  - b. Ideological
  - c. Economic gain
  - d. Material welfare

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Applying

6. In international relations, actors can be any of the following EXCEPT:
- a. international organizations.
  - b. groups.
  - c. ideologies.
  - d. states.

ANS: C                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Remembering

7. Which of the following is an example of a state?
- a. The United Nations
  - b. Iraq
  - c. Saddam Hussein
  - d. The American Republican Party

ANS: B                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Applying

8. Which of the following is an example of a failed state?
- a. A state that suffers an industrial slump
  - b. A state that changes its flag to reflect a new leader
  - c. A state that experiences a major debt crisis
  - d. A state whose central government collapses

ANS: D                      DIF: Medium                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Applying

9. Which entity is the most prominent actor in international relations?
- a. States
  - b. People
  - c. Nongovernmental organizations
  - d. Terrorist groups

ANS: A                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Remembering

10. What role did crosscutting lines of authority play in the emergence of the Peace of Westphalia?
- a. The overlapping allegiances created a source of constant conflict among cities, monarchies, and religious leaders.
  - b. The system was made doubly stable through all the linkages across the cities.
  - c. The lines of authority produced peaceful collaboration between the Holy Roman Empire and other countries.
  - d. Peace treaties often resulted from the crosscutting allegiances.

ANS: A                      DIF: Difficult                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

11. Which of the following is a potential example of state loss of sovereignty?
- a. A state changes its currency from a cash system to an electronic system.
  - b. A state takes over all of its banks and declares itself the sole lender to its citizens.
  - c. A corporation successfully takes over the enactment and adjudication of a state's laws.
  - d. A state expands its control over ocean waterways.

ANS: C                      DIF: Medium                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Applying

12. Which of the following would be considered a threat to the nature of sovereignty?
- a. A superior international government
  - b. Domestic markets
  - c. Urbanization
  - d. Journalism

ANS: A                      DIF: Difficult                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

13. The following are all examples of nongovernmental organizations EXCEPT:
- a. Amnesty International.
  - b. the United Nations.
  - c. Greenpeace.
  - d. Doctors without Borders.

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Applying

14. What is a strategic interaction?
- A condition whereby different actors have different interests
  - A condition in which actors try to understand the other in order to cooperate
  - A condition in which both actors are uncertain of their future relationship
  - A condition in which each actor's plan is contingent upon its estimate of what the other actor is expected to do

ANS: D                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

15. You are competing against fellow students for the highest grade in the class. Given this competition, which of the following is the best example of a potential strategic interaction?
- You study for the exam.
  - You calculate the scores and attendance of every student in the class.
  - Students in the class study for the exam individually.
  - Everyone collaborates to do better together.

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

16. Cooperation is a type of:
- institution that makes agreements easier for two actors.
  - institution that sets the rules for interactions between actors.
  - interaction in which one actor will receive more and the other actor less of the desired outcome.
  - interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve some outcome that leaves at least one of them better off.

ANS: D                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding


17. Which of the following is an example of cooperation?
- A group of friends each contributing money to throw a party
  - A single corporation lobbying Congress for trade protection from foreign imports
  - A country unilaterally cutting back on its emission of greenhouse gases
  - Two water districts agreeing that each should get half of a local river's water

ANS: A                      DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

18. In the figure, a point on the line segment  $ab$  represents what in relation to  $q$ ?



- a. A gain only for actor A
- b. A gain only for actor B
- c. A loss for both actors
- d. A gain for both actors


ANS: D

DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

19. What does the triangle *qba* represent?



- a. The set of all possible improvements for actor A
- b. The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B
- c. The zone in which neither actor would agree to a bargain
- d. The zone of potential losses for both actors


ANS: B

DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

20. What does line segment *qb* represent?



- Possible improvements for actor A that do not affect the welfare of B
- Possible improvements for actor B that do not affect the welfare of A
- The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B
- The zone of potential losses for both actors


ANS: B

DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

21. What is true if the status quo agreement is at point *a*?



- Any movement within the *qba* triangle is positive-sum.
- Any movement along the line segment *ab* is zero-sum.
- Agreement within triangle *qba* is likely.
- Actor A will improve its share by making an agreement that is closer to point *b*.

ANS: B

DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

22. If bargaining is a fixed-sum, what are the implications for the actors participating in it?
- The pie can be expanded to make both better off.

- b. The outcome can be fixed such that everyone wins.
- c. Both agents will lose something in the process.
- d. One will be made worse off.

ANS: D                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

23. In which of the following situations would you expect defection?
- a. Both actors have shared interests.
  - b. Individual interests of one are superseded by the collective interest.
  - c. Individual interests of one supersede the collective interest.
  - d. Both sets of individual interests are bolstered by the collective interest.

ANS: C                      DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

24. Two actors facing a coordination problem are:
- a. unlikely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem.
  - b. likely to find a mutually acceptable solution only if one actor has more power than the other.
  - c. likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that is difficult to enforce.
  - d. likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that requires little enforcement.

ANS: D                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

25. Which of the following is an example of a solution to a coordination problem?
- a. A driver sets flares on the road to mark an accident.
  - b. Airline pilots go on strike to raise wages.
  - c. Peacekeepers separate two armies in a civil war to stop the conflict.
  - d. Cybersecurity experts set a universal standard format for malware reporting so that all firms can share.

ANS: D                      DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

26. \_\_\_\_\_ interactions are the simplest kind of cooperation between actors.
- a. Zero-sum
  - b. Coordination
  - c. Positive-sum
  - d. Collaborative

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

27. What kind of problem does the Prisoner's Dilemma story illustrate?
- a. Coordination
  - b. Linkage
  - c. Coercion
  - d. Collaboration

ANS: D                      DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

28. The most likely outcome for both participants in the Prisoner's Dilemma is that:

- a. both keep quiet so that both go free.
- b. both provide evidence against the other and go to jail.
- c. one prisoner keeps quiet, while the other provides evidence and avoids jail.
- d. both keep quiet and spend time in jail.

ANS: B                    DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

29. What was the key characteristic of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union that makes it applicable to the Prisoner's Dilemma?
- a. Each side had real incentives to cheat in order to spend less money.
  - b. Each side wanted to collaborate in order to keep from blowing up the world in a nuclear war.
  - c. Each side had an incentive to cheat in order to maintain superiority over the other.
  - d. The United States provided evidence of nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union remained quiet and thus defected instead of cooperating.

ANS: C                    DIF: Medium

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

30. Which is the best definition of a public good?
- a. A benefit that is paid for by the government out of tax dollars collected from the general public
  - b. A product created by public agencies for the use of all citizens of a country
  - c. A product that cannot be withheld from anyone and whose use does not prohibit anyone else from enjoying it
  - d. The supplies that governments provide for infrastructure projects

ANS: C                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

31. Which of the following is an example of a public good?
- a. A free lunch provided by a soup kitchen
  - b. The clean air resulting from laws reducing pollution
  - c. A tariff protecting an important national industry
  - d. Electric cars that reduce smog for everyone

ANS: B                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

32. A state wanting to free ride with regard to ozone depletion would:
- a. sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases but continue to produce such ozone-depleting emissions, while other states decrease their own emissions.
  - b. sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases but reduce emissions only if all other signatories also reduce their emissions.
  - c. refuse to sign an agreement to reduce greenhouse gases because it would not trust other states to reduce their own emissions.
  - d. freely reduce emissions without signing any entangling agreements.

ANS: A                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

33. Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?
- Because countries are better able to threaten reciprocal punishment and cooperation in the future.
  - Because countries that are closer together are also more likely to cooperate.
  - Because countries are more likely to cooperate when no country is more powerful than the other.
  - Because multiple interactions make the threat of force less credible.

ANS: A                    DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

34. Which of the following is an example of linkage?
- You and your neighbor agree to take turns shoveling your driveways on snow days.
  - You agree to drive your little brother to school, and your older brother agrees to do the dishes when it is your turn.
  - Your friend doesn't share his lunch with you so you refuse to share yours the next day.
  - The president of the United States enacts tariffs on steel so the Chinese premier also enacts tariffs on steel.

ANS: B                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

35. In 2003, why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?
- Saddam Hussein thought Iran might attack if the Iranians knew he did not have any weapons of mass destruction.
  - Saddam Hussein thought that the United States would be deterred from invading if it thought Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction.
  - Saddam Hussein had been lied to by Iraqi scientists and thought that Iraq really did have weapons of mass destruction.
  - Saddam Hussein thought that inspectors from the United Nations would be able to find out for themselves that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction.

ANS: A                    DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

36. Which of the following is an example of iteration and reciprocity?
- U.S. forces announce that they are leaving Afghanistan.
  - Entrenched forces enact a system of "live and let live" during a prolonged and uncertain war.
  - You leave a tip at a restaurant that you will never return to.
  - The Russians invade Crimea.

ANS: B                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

37. If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide, the reversion outcome would be that:
- the Security Council members would return for more negotiations.
  - the genocide would be ended.



- c. the genocide would continue.
- d. economic sanctions would automatically be enacted.

ANS: C                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

38. When bargaining with others, one actor will have an advantage if:
- a. the actor is more satisfied with the reversion outcome than the others.
  - b. the actor cares more about the outcome of the bargain.
  - c. the actor needs to end the bargaining process quickly.
  - d. the actor has no other options but to come to an agreement.

ANS: A                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Understanding

39. Imposing some cost on others to reduce the value of the reversion outcome is known as:
- a. coercion.
  - b. reversion.
  - c. linkage.
  - d. collaboration.

ANS: A                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

40. One means with which a country can coerce other countries is:
- a. walking away from negotiations.
  - b. setting the agenda for negotiations.
  - c. threatening or using military force against the other countries.
  - d. having an international organization mediate the dispute.

ANS: C                    DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

41. An actor using agenda-setting power during bargaining:
- a. makes the last (and decisive) move.
  - b. uses knowledge of the agenda to create coalitions with other actors.
  - c. links items on the agenda to other issues, in order to coerce other actors.
  - d. acts first and therefore changes what choices are available to the other actors.
  - e. keeps the official record of the proceedings and uses this to promote its own description of the agreement or treaty.

ANS: D                    DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying

42. When an actor can get a better deal through alternatives to reaching a bargain, this is sometimes referred to as:
- a. the reversion outcome.
  - b. an outside option.
  - c. negotiation.
  - d. iterative retaliation.

ANS: B                    DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Remembering

43. Which of the following is an example of an informal institution?
- a. The United Nations
  - b. International Monetary Fund
  - c. norms against slavery
  - d. World Trade Organization

ANS: C                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics  
MSC: Applying

44. Why is enforcement by institutions actually “self-enforcement”?
- a. Institutions can force their own members to comply with their agreements without outside help.
  - b. There is no central international authority capable of forcing actors to cooperate.
  - c. To force members to cooperate, actors pay dues to their institutions to create their own enforcement agency.
  - d. Each institution is defined as a sovereign entity or “self.”

ANS: B                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

45. What is the purpose of setting clear standards of behavior?
- a. It allows others to determine if an agent is defecting.
  - b. It carries automatic moral authority.
  - c. So that states can punish their own politicians.
  - d. It increases the costs of joint decision making.

ANS: A                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
MSC: Understanding

46. Which of the following is an example of an institution helping to verify compliance?
- a. The United Nations banning the use of satellites and planes to spy on other countries.
  - b. The North American Free Trade Agreement having 22 chapters of detailed rules on trade and investment between the member countries.
  - c. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors searching for nuclear weapons that would violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
  - d. The United Nations Security Council approving the use of military force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990.

ANS: C                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
MSC: Applying

47. How did the norm of election monitoring spread even to less democratic elections?
- a. Pseudo-democrats began copying true democrats in order to access foreign aid.
  - b. Election monitoring made countries more honest about their elections.
  - c. The United Nations began to name and shame nonparticipating countries.
  - d. Widespread election fraud was eliminated.

ANS: A                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
MSC: Remembering

48. What is one effect of creating clear rules within institutions like the United Nations?
- a. It makes it possible for the United Nations to force states to comply.
  - b. It reduces the cost and energy associated with making collective decisions.
  - c. It undermines sovereignty.
  - d. It creates a natural harmony of interests that inspires peace among warring actors.

ANS: B                    DIF: Moderate            REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
 MSC: Understanding

49. The best example of institutional bias (reflecting the history of its creation) is the:
- one country–one vote procedure in the United Nations General Assembly.
  - unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community before 1986.
  - veto power of the five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council.
  - consensus procedure in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

ANS: C                    DIF: Easy                    REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
 MSC: Applying

50. Why do powerful countries bother to follow the rules of the WTO?
- Powerful countries receive greater benefits by maintaining a system where everyone plays by the rules.
  - The WTO locks in the powerful participants and binds them permanently to the institution.
  - Powerful countries see moral value in helping poorer countries.
  - Powerful countries are fooled into thinking they obtain benefits.

ANS: A                    DIF: Moderate            REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
 MSC: Understanding

51. Even though currently powerful countries like Germany, Brazil, and Japan would like a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, they have not started their own competing international organization and have kept their protests within the United Nations' system. This is an example of what?
- It is often cheaper and easier to use existing institutions even if they do not exactly match an actor's preferences.
  - Institutions with self-enforcement are more likely to last.
  - Institutions are created to reflect the biases of those who have the most power at that time.
  - Institutions are most effective when they serve multiple roles, such as assisting in verifying compliance and reducing costs of joint decision making.

ANS: A                    DIF: Moderate            REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?  
 MSC: Applying

52. For the game below, what is A2's payoff in cell *CD*?

		<b>A2</b>	
		C	D
<b>A1</b>	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.

		<b>A2</b>	
		C	D
<b>A1</b>	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	4, 1	2, 2*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1</li> <li>2</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3</li> <li>4</li> </ol> |
|--|--|

ANS: D  
MSC: Applying

DIF: Easy

REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

53. For the game below, what is the equilibrium (or equilibria) for A1 and A2?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	4, 1	2, 2*

- a. C, C
- b. C, D

- c. D, C
- d. D, D

ANS: D  
MSC: Understanding

DIF: Moderate

REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

54. Below is an example of which game?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.
	D	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	1, 4
	D	4, 1	2, 2*

- a. Chicken
- b. The Prisoner's Dilemma

- c. Stag Hunt
- d. Cooperation.

ANS: B  
MSC: Applying

DIF: Difficult

REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

55. For the game below, what is A2's payoff in cell DD?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."
	D	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	2, 4*
	D	4, 2*	1, 1

- a. 1
- b. 2

- c. 3
- d. 4

ANS: A                      DIF: Easy                      REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory  
 MSC: Applying

56. For the game below, what is the equilibrium (or equilibria) for A1 and A2?

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."
	D	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.

		A2	
		C	D
A1	C	3, 3	2, 4*
	D	4, 2*	1, 1

- a. C, C
- b. D, D

- c. C, D and D, C
- d. C, C; D, D; and C, D

ANS: C                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory  
 MSC: Understanding

57. Below is an example of which game?



		A2			
		C	D		
A1	C	Both hunters split the stag.	A1 goes hungry; A2 eats the rabbit.	4, 4*	1, 3
	D	A1 eats the rabbit; A2 goes hungry.	Both hunters split the rabbit.	3, 1	2, 2*

- a. Chicken  
 b. The Prisoner's Dilemma  
 c. Stag Hunt  
 d. Coordination

ANS: C                      DIF: Difficult                      REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory  
 MSC: Applying

60. Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?  
 a. A trade agreement in which each side wants more concessions from the other country.  
 b. A nuclear crisis in which each side wants to take a tough stance.  
 c. A peacekeeping mission for which countries are reluctant to send their troops.  
 d. An invasion of a small country by a large coalition of countries that did not want to attack alone.

ANS: B                      DIF: Moderate                      REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory  
 MSC: Applyin

**ESSAY**

1. Despite the fact that states are usually given priority over individuals and institutions, under which kinds of conditions are individuals and institutions potentially more important?

ANS:  
 While states are given analytical priority in determining the causes and effects of conflict in the international system, there are instances in which individuals may be more important. In particular, cases in which domestic conflict and terrorism are prevalent. These factors can have widespread effects on both great and small states, and as such can complicate the central importance of states.

REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?                      MSC: Analyzing

2. What are the lessons of the Peace of Westphalia and how do they help us understand the way in which the contemporary state-based system works?

ANS:  
 The Peace of Westphalia provided clarity between the centers of power and attempted to eliminate the problem of the overlapping power of local leaders, monarchies, and religious powers. The period of peace that followed also serves as an example of the value of sovereignty—the principle of nonintervention in state affairs.

REF: Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?                      MSC: Analyzing

3. What is the difference between a national interest and the interest of a politician acting as a head of state? Give an example of each to illustrate your point.

ANS:

The politician acting as head of state may have private interests that meet their personal goals, such as getting wealthy, leaving a good legacy, etc. This is distinct from the aggregated needs and goals of a state, which begin with the necessity of security. The path to security for states inheres in the acquisition of power. In this sense, the interests of the political leader and the state might align, but they are distinct.

REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Applying

4. What are public goods, and does the Internet count as a public good? Should it?

ANS:

A public good is something that is produced but that is nonrival and nonexcludable. Because the Internet can be cut off, it is rival and excludable, but it is important for people in countries to have access to information. As such, while it is not a public good, it might make sense for countries to treat it as such.

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing|Evaluating

5. How does bargaining differ from cooperation? Provide examples in international relations that demonstrate the difference.

ANS:

Bargaining is a fixed-amount negotiation in which at least one actor will be made worse off. In contrast, cooperation is an interaction in which at least one actor will be made better off while the other suffers no harm or is made better off as well. Student examples may include territorial disputes for bargaining, and security or trade agreements for cooperation.

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Applying|Analyzing

6. Of the different mechanisms in bargaining (coercion, outside options, agenda setting) how often are each of these available to small states? Which of these is likely to benefit small states versus large states?

ANS:

While all the mechanisms of bargaining could theoretically be available to small states, a state's relative power will mostly dictate how easily a state can use these mechanisms. What this means is, while it is not impossible for small states to bargain successfully, it is uncommon.

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

7. What is the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and why is mutual defection the expected outcome of the game?

ANS:

The Prisoner's Dilemma game is a collaboration game. While it makes sense for the actors to cooperate in order to gain some goods, the cost of cooperating while the other is defecting is too high, and the benefit of defecting in case the other cooperates creates a condition in which the rational answer is to defect.

REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Understanding



8. Under what conditions are both hunters likely to cooperate in the Stag Hunt game?

ANS:

The Stag Hunt is a coordination game, highlighting some problems that can be solved by creating standards and institutions in the international system. The hunters would like to get the stag but they can only do what they expect the other hunter will do. Thus, there are two outcomes: one in which both get less than they want, and one in which both get more. Coordination provides a solution so that each hunter knows what to expect and can get more

REF: 2. Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory

MSC: Understanding

9. Explain how the number of actors, iteration, the importance of the future, and information contribute to successful cooperation.

ANS:

Multiple iterations and the expectation of future interaction make it possible for actors to impose costs in the next round if actors defect in the current one. Cooperation is more difficult if there are more actors because there needs to be clarity regarding communication between actors. The more actors, the greater the likelihood of miscommunication and miscoordination. Similarly, cooperation requires that all actors have sufficient information about events in order to cooperate successfully.

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

10. Explain how access to information affects the probability of successful cooperation.

ANS:

Access to information helps in conditions where the monitoring of defection and cooperation are required. If the parties do not have access to information, they will not be able to determine cooperation and the whole collaboration falls apart.

REF: 2. Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want?

MSC: Analyzing

11. When states comply with international institutions, such as complying with the United Nations under conditions of peacekeeping, does this constitute a dilution of sovereignty?

ANS:

The principle of nonintervention is a principle that should not be understood as an immutable law, but more as a norm of the international system. In this way, states can cede some of their sovereignty to international institutions in order to cooperate with other countries.

REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Evaluating

12. Discuss the ways in which informal international institutions might be more effective than formal ones.

ANS:

Informal institutions—like avoiding killing doctors in war zones, or avoiding violating other states' sovereignty—endure because the norm has been established to largely serve the interests of all the countries in the system. In this sense, they can be more effective than formal institutions. Conversely, formal institutions can at least have the binding power of state sanctions should they be found to be in violation.

REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

13. What is the role of international inspectors and treaties in helping to overcome Prisoner's Dilemmas? How does it affect the payoffs?

ANS:

Because the Prisoner's Dilemma is a collaboration game, the creation of restrictions like treaties and inspectors can adjust the payoffs since both parties do not feel tempted to defect for a chance at a better payoff.

REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Understanding

14. Does the United Nations have an institutional bias against the United States? In the General Assembly? In the Security Council?

ANS:

The United Nations Security Council is biased toward the United States because the United States has veto power over any resolutions. Conversely, the UN General Assembly is biased against the United States because the voting process is one country–one vote, regardless of power.

REF: 2. Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics?

MSC: Analyzing

15. Does the spread of election monitoring mean that eventually most election systems will be fair and free? What other methods might be helpful beyond this informal institution?

ANS:

The norm of election monitoring could create better and stronger elections globally. However, because authoritarian states also use election monitoring (sometimes by less scrupulous monitoring teams) and still cheat, it is unclear whether it will actually cause a change. What might make the system more robust is to have a single set of monitors (who universally observe) seated in an international institution with a good reputation.

REF: 2. Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics?

MSC: Applying